The aim of the Ukrainian operation in Kursk and the evolution of the war in Ukraine!
There is no doubt the success of the Ukrainian Forces is very significant at the tactical-operational level, which after a surprise invasion on August 6 (the first invasion of Russian territory after WWII) ended in the occupation of Russian territories of the Kursk Region, an area of just over 1000 square kilometers with dozens of settlements and hundreds of Russian prisoners. But beyond the humiliation of Russia, which tried to downplay the event, the blow to Putin's prestige and after the first smiles in Kiev as well as in the capitals of the Western countries that support Ukraine, a reasonable reflection is created both for the operation itself and for the continuation of the war.
In an article in Foreign Policy, Harvard University Professor of International Relations, Stephen M. Walt, poses the critical question of whether this surprise counterattack by Ukraine against Russia constitutes a turning point in the war, a sideshow, or a strategic mistake? Moreover, the Professor also wonders if this short-term success could have medium-long-term positive effects on the wider implications for Western policy towards Russia in general and the war in Ukraine in particular! Israeli Analysts Boaz Golani and Jacob Nagel (former National Security Advisor of Israel) express similar concerns in their joint article on the well-known American website National Interest on August 30. But let's take things from the beginning and try to analyze them by drawing clear lines between wishful thinking and harsh reality, despite the difficulties of the "fog of war". First of all, what was it that made the Ukrainians go ahead with "audacity" in a high-risk operation and invade Russian territory? University of Arizona Political Science Professor, John P. Willerton, in an August 30 National Interest op-ed, argues that desperation over the turn the war on Ukraine had taken was the main reason he "bet" on this bold venture since it was looking for a way to compensate for the unfavorable developments. Alongside this assessment comes that of Professor Emeritus, Sir Lawrence Freedman, of the School of War Studies at Kings College London, who in an article on his own website assesses that Ukraine's operation in Kursk was intended to shift the narrative around the war with a win!
With a war of attrition that increasingly exhausts and destroys the country, with the necessarily defensive attitude due to the inability to carry out an offensive maneuver to recover at least part of the occupied territories from the Russians and the main goal is to make the Russian accessions to its territories as "costly" as possible, the Ukrainian political and military leadership was rightly looking for a way to seriously damage Russia beyond periodic strikes on oil facilities in its interior.
The main benefit of the Kursk operation for Kyiv was that it showed it was able to take the initiative at least at the tactical level with serious Ukrainian gains and serious damage for Russia. In addition to boosting Ukrainian morale, the operation has brought the war in Ukraine back at the top of global attention and may strengthen some voices calling for an increase in the quantity as well as the quality of Western support. Our assessment is that there is no strategic footprint which could change the flood of war, neither operationally, nor force the Russians to transfer forces from the eastern front to the Pokrovsk sector to reduce the pressure on the existing exhausted six Ukrainian Brigades fighting there. The Russian military force of about 30,000 troops that intercepted the Ukrainians in the Kursk region after the poorly trained (for high-intensity combat) Russian border guards fled, was transferred from the rear support area and was the reserves of the Russian High Command. Ukraine threw the main body of its reserves into the Kursk operation. Operations must aim at victory, and victory means for Kyiv the recovery of its territories occupied by Russia and certainly not to lose other parts of its territory. American analyst Dr. James Holmes of the US Naval War College pointed out in an article in the National Interest that "it makes absolutely no strategic sense to compromise what matters most for the sake of something else that matters less, no matter how ‘seductive' it is"! In short we would say that for Ukraine, that faces the specter of defeat, the priority should be to keep as much of its territory as possible while trying to recover its hitherto lost territory.
The Russians, with inherent weaknesses, did not foresee the unforeseen! They were totally surprised, they were not able to counterattack from the beginning, and suffered a defeat, losing ground of their territory, achieving interception of the Ukrainians after 15-16 days! But steadily, albeit slowly, even at high cost, they continue to advance on the Donbas front and are now very close to the city of Pokrovsk, which is a rail and transportation hub and main logistics area for the Ukrainian defensive forces. The situation there is extremely difficult as President Zelensky himself and the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Forces Sirsky (who is by the way... Russian) have admitted that Russia is moving towards decisive success when the Ukrainians lack reserves since they were used in Kursk and thus cannot resist successfully this time. Niko Lange, a former German defense official who is now a fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis, noted that while the Kursk operation gave Ukraine "tangible gains," Putin is downplaying the invasion and focusing his efforts on eastern Ukraine. It is as if he is saying to the Ukrainians: "You can stay, you can leave, do what you want, I will go to Donbas"! The ground that has been lost or further will be lost now in Donbas Russia will keep.
But Ukraine cannot hold Kursk indefinitely. The potential loss of Pokrovsk poses a serious operational threat to the logistics of the entire region, cutting off supply lines from Volendar in the south to Horlivka in the north, and would worsen the situation for Ukrainian forces in Donbass leading to possible further casualties. At the same time, the Russians intensified the war of attrition that they are conducting with the aim of bending the will to resist with new mass attacks on August 26 in 15 cities of Ukraine and on energy infrastructure with 236 Drones, as UAVs are widely called in the media, Cruise Missiles and also Hypersonic Missiles Kinzal. These attacks, albeit smaller in scope and intensity, continued until yesterday with casualties and significant damage. Parenthetically, it is pointed out that while before the Russian invasion Ukraine produced 50 Giga Watts (GW) of energy today it barely reaches 20 GW.
The Kremlin has launched a campaign to raise the patriotic sentiments of the Russian people by likening the Ukrainian invasion to that of Nazi Germany while also exploiting the spread of already limited Ukrainian forces. It must be said that Russia's poor performance and other weaknesses and therefore its limited reach to eliminate the narrative of some in the West that Ukraine was only the first step before Russia launched an attack on countries such as the Baltic States. Also, on the occasion of the successful Kursk operation, it is not serious by some western circles to claim that Russia's "red lines" and threats to use nuclear weapons and escalation are... bluff. Undeniably Ukraine's invasion of Russian territory can be seen as a major development but Putin has no incentive to escalate as long as his forces are still winning in Donbas. We believe that the risk of escalation by Russia will arise in the event only of a catastrophic defeat, something that has nothing to do with the current situation. In conclusion, I will repeat that the Ukrainian success in Kursk, which has raised more questions than answers, is not a "turning point" and I share the concern of many reputable international analysts that it may ultimately turn out to be a mistake if the Russians expel Ukrainian forces from the region when these could serve as reserves to support defense operations in Donbas. Kiev can certainly withdraw without Russian pressure whenever the situation implies, but until now their losses are considerable.
The course of the war positively or negatively for Ukraine will be determined primarily by the developments in Eastern Ukraine and not by the Kursk operation! This war, which, let’ s not forget, started because of the Russian invasion, will continue from the moment both sides estimate that by continuing it they will achieve a better outcome. But is it so? As a final remark we would say that the specific military success of Ukraine should be seen as an opportunity to start serious talks on de-escalation and a ceasefire in principle and not at all as a basis for prolonging a costly war in which Ukraine can survive even half ruined with the chances of winning ever decreasing!
This article originally issued on the Athens Greece Website on 3nd September before the severe Russian strikes in Potlava and Lviv
Lt Gen (ret) Konstantinos Loukopoulos Geostrategic Analyst